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This Article examines the judicial and non-judicial relief available to
both a sports team and an athlete in the event that either of the parties
alleges a breach of their standard player contract. The Article will ini-
tially examine the jurisdictional requirements applicable to lawsuits initi-
ated in the sports context. After exploring the peculiarities of personal
jurisdiction involved in suits between teams and athletes, the Article will
next focus on the specific contractual provisions supporting judicial
relief.
This Article will identify a firmly entrenched pattern which has
emerged regarding the enforceability of sports contracts. When an ath-
lete initiates a civil proceeding based upon the alleged breach of his stan-
dard player contract, judicial relief will generally be denied if the team
demands that the dispute be submitted to an appropriate arbitration tri-
bunal.' On the other hand, when a team initiates a civil proceeding -
typically based upon the athlete's "jumping"2 to a team in another league
- courts are more likely to intervene, usually by issuing a negative in-
* Portions of this Article will appear in a chapter of a forthcoming treatise entitled The
Law of Professional and Amateur Sports, to be published by Clark Boardman Company, Ltd.
** B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1982; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law,
University of California, Berkeley, 1985; Member, State Bar of California. Mr. Uberstine, also
the author of Covering All The Bases: A Comprehensive Research Guide to Sports Law, is
associated with the law firm of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, and is resident in the
firm's Los Angeles offices.
*** B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1980; J.D., Northeastern University
School of Law, 1983; Member, State Bar of California; State Bar of Massachusetts; District of
Columbia Bar. Mr. Grad is associated with the law firm of Sidley & Austin, and is resident in
the firm's Los Angeles offices.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 128-47.
2. The concept of "jumping" refers to the athlete's acceptance of employment with an-
other team and the corresponding repudiation of his existing contract.
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junction restraining the athlete from playing for another team during the
pendency of the contract. 3 If a team successfully obtains a negative in-
junction, the athlete is faced with the dilemma of having to retire, "sit
out" for the required time, or rejoin his former team. In order to avoid
loss of income and potential deterioration of skills, the athlete will usu-
ally choose to play for his former team and request that the underlying
dispute be resolved through arbitration.
This Article concludes with a discussion of the team's non-judicial
remedies should the athlete attempt to "jump" to another team in the
same league. As the following discussion makes clear, the various league
rules, constitutions, and contracts effectively deter "intra-league jump-
ing," thereby obviating the need for judicial intervention.
II. ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION FOR JUDICIAL RELIEF
In order to establish in personam jurisdiction, two threshold require-
ments must be satisfied. As an initial matter, the exercise of jurisdiction
must fall within the scope of the relevant state "long arm" statute. In
addition, the exercise of power over the defendant must comport with
constitutional limitations defining due process of law. With respect to
the former statutory requirement, modem state statutes tend to vest
courts with expansive jurisdictional authority.4 These "liberal" statutes
provide that virtually any form of conduct having an impact within the
forum state will fall within the purview of the statute. Indeed, some stat-
utes simply provide that state courts may assert jurisdiction provided the
exercise of authority is not inconsistent with the federal Constitution.5
In states with this type of statute, the only relevant inquiry is into the due
process standard.
The basic due process standard was comprehensively set forth in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,6 the seminal case addressing a
state court's power to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant.7 International Shoe and its progenys mandate that before a
3. See, e.g., Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902); Dallas Foot-
ball Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
4. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586, 589 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967). See
also Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enters., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973).
5. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ("A court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5 (1983) (authorizing jurisdiction where there are "the neces-
sary minimum contacts ... in every case not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or
laws of the United States.").
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. Id. at 316.
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court may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resi-
dent, the defendant must have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the
forum state "such that the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." 9 According to the Supreme Court in Han-
son v. Denckla, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is only proper if the
out-of-state defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thereby invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws. ' "o Moreover, in order to comport with tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the defendant must
"reasonably anticipate being haled into court [in the forum state].'' 1
Although the primary focus should be on the nature and quality of de-
fendant's contacts with the forum state, the state's interest in the litiga-
tion and the plaintiff's interest in not having to litigate in another forum
should be considered in deciding whether jurisdiction is proper. 2
A. Suits Against Athletes
As with any lawsuit, when a team institutes a civil action against an
athlete, it must first ascertain the appropriate forum. This section ini-
tially examines the athlete's residence and the situs of the parties' con-
tract negotiations as an appropriate forum for sports litigation. The
section concludes with a discussion of the considerations involved in se-
lecting the most favorable forum when the team has various options
available.
1. The Player's Residence As An Appropriate Forum
Although an athlete clearly may be sued in the state of his domi-
cile,' 3 the question often arises whether the athlete may be sued in a state
where he is only a temporary resident. This question is especially impor-
tant because athletes often maintain more than one residence. In many
instances, residency alone will subject the athlete to jurisdiction in the
forum state. 14 However, in assessing the sufficiency of the athlete's "min-
8. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
9. International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colum-
bia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (quoting International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316).
10. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
11. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
12. See Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909,
924 (1960).
13. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
14. See Myrick v. Superior Court, 256 P.2d 348, aff'd, 41 Cal. 2d 519, 261 P.2d 255
(1953); State ex rel. Merritt v. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 496, 195 So. 145 (1940); Camden Safe-
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imum contacts," courts have considered the following factors: (1) the
length of time the athlete spends in the state; (2) the types of activities the
athlete undertakes in the state; and (3) the athlete's living arrangements
in the state.
1 5
In sports litigation, an inquiry into the nature of the athlete's activi-
ties in the forum state is most critical because they evince the significance
and permanence of his relationship with the state. If the temporary resi-
dence is also located where the athlete's new team is situated, the requi-
site contacts would clearly seem to exist.1 6  Because the athlete's
association with the forum state is generally substantial and purposeful
under these conditions, a court's exercise of jurisdiction would appear to
satisfy the due process requirement. 7
2. The Place Of Contracting As An Appropriate Forum
Substantial support exists for the general proposition that a defend-
ant-athlete who negotiates and enters into a contract in a particular state
thereby subjects himself to the jurisdiction of that state's courts, at least
with respect to the enforcement of his contract.18 This rule is especially
important when an athlete's contract is negotiated in a state where
neither the athlete nor the team has other permanent contacts (e.g., when
a college athlete negotiates a professional contract in the state where he
attended college).
Notwithstanding the validity of the above-stated general proposi-
tion, most courts would probably decline to exert jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant-athlete whose sole contact with the forum state
involves the negotiation of a sports contract. This is particularly so
where the plaintiff-team has no substantial association with the forum
state, as the state does not have a significant policy interest in protecting
the team's rights under the contract. 9 The courts which have exercised
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Barbour, 66 N.J.L. 103, 48 A. 1008 (1901); Rawstone v. Maguire, 265
N.Y. 204, 192 N.E. 294 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 (1971).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 comment a (1971).
16. Id.
17. See supra text accompanying notes 4-12.
18. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n
v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Clinic Masters, Inc. v. McCollar, 269 F. Supp. 395 (D. Colo.
1967). See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969); Comment, The Isolated Contact as a
Basis of Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents, 22 CHI. L. REV. 674 (1955).
19. Normally, the place of contracting is important for jurisdictional purposes when the
plaintiff-team is a resident of the forum state. See, e.g., Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf &
Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966); Aucoin v. Hanson, 207 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1968); Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Atlas Concrete Pipe, Inc., 41 Mich. App. 58, 199
N.W.2d 531 (1972). See also Lone Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d
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jurisdiction over a dispute simply because a contract was executed within
their state have required that a substantial part of the relationship be
completed in that state.2° Thus, mere preliminary negotiations or the
single act of signing the contract in the forum state would not appear to
be sufficient "minimum contacts" if the real locus of the relationship ex-
ists elsewhere. 2 Consequently, unless the team can establish a more du-
rable or permanent association with a forum state, courts will favor the
defendant-athlete and require the plaintiff-team to enforce the contract in
a more appropriate forum.
3. Selecting The Forum
In determining which forum to select, the former team should con-
sider various relevant factors, including the convenience of the forum,
the existence of favorable precedent, and the existence of local bias. Ad-
ditionally, a factor which is particularly important to a team attempting
to obtain a negative injunction is whether an equitable decree will be
enforced by sister-state courts under the full-faith-and-credit clause.22
Thus, in a typical situation, if the former team institutes a civil proceed-
ing in the state where the franchise is located (State A), and the athlete
has already moved to join his new team in another state (State B), the
former team should generally attempt to enforce its judgment in State B.
A split of authority exists regarding whether the full-faith-and-
credit clause applies to the enforcement of negative injunctions.
Although the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on this issue,
2 3
some courts have refused to enforce negative injunctions in order to
avoid responsibility for modifying and enforcing the decree in the event
69 (5th Cir. 1961); Clinic Masters, Inc. v. McCollar, 269 F. Supp. 395 (D. Colo. 1967); Com-
pania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 943 (1955).
20. See, e.g., Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.
1966); Lone Star Motor Imports Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961);
Clinic Masters, Inc. v. McCollar, 269 F. Supp. 395 (D. Colo. 1967); Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 499 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958); Aucoin v. Hanson, 207 So. 2d 834
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969).
21. See National Television Sales, Inc. v. Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co., 284 F.
Supp. 68 (N.D. III. 1968); Baughman Manufacturing Co. v. Hein, 44 Ill. App. 3d 373, 194
N.E.2d 664 (1963); Wirth v. Prenyl, 29 A.D.2d 373, 288 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1968).
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cls. 1-2 ("Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to
the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may
by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be
proved, and the effect thereof.").
23. See Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IOWA L. REV. 183, 189
(1957). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102 comment c (1971)
(refusing to take a position on this issue).
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circumstances change.24 Thus, if a court determines that the burden of
retaining jurisdiction over a particular dispute is substantial, a former
team might be precluded from enforcing a valid judgment against the
athlete in the state where he is currently playing. Because the former
team's only alternative would be to institute a new action, it should fully
consider this possibility prior to selecting a particular forum.
B. Suits Against Teams
The general in personam jurisdiction analysis outlined above should
be undertaken in determining whether jurisdiction over a team is proper
in a particular forum.2 5 Although the requisite "minimum contacts" will
always exist in a team's home state, difficulties arise when attempting to
establish jurisdiction in a foreign state.26 In analyzing these jurisdic-
tional problems, certain unique aspects of professional team sports are
relevant, including: (1) where games are played; (2) where revenues are
derived; and (3) the nature and extent of team broadcasts and recruiting
efforts in the forum state.
1. Games Played In The Forum State
The number of games played against other teams in the forum state
is a major factor in determining "minimum contacts."' 27 Although the
number of games played each year in a given state may be small,28 the
significance of these contacts should not be underestimated. Because ma-
jor team sports are built on interstate competition and rivalry, fan inter-
est and home attendance are increased with these "away-games,"
evincing significant forum contact. Moreover, broadcasting contracts are
24. See Buswell v. Buswell, 377 Pa. 487, 105 A.2d 608 (1954); Lajoie, 202 Pa. at 210. See
also Rich v. Con-Stan Indus. Inc., 449 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Allee v. Van Cleave,
263 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). But see Kahrs v. Verde Energy Corp., 604 F. Supp.
879, 880 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (questioning Lajoie).
25. See supra text accompanying notes 4-12.
26. See Manton v. California Sports, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Munchak
Corp. v. Riko Enters. Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973); Erving v. Virginia Squires
Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972);
Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. App. 3d 352, 215 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1985) (in-state activities sufficient to support jurisdiction for cause of action arising out of
those activities, but not for a cause of action unrelated to those activities). See also Martin v.
Detroit Lions, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d 472, 108 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1973); Rodwell v. Pro Football,
Inc., 45 Mich. App. 408, 206 N.W.2d 773 (1973).
27. Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Haw-
kins v. National Basketball Ass'n, 288 F. Supp. 614, 617 (W.D. Pa. 1968); American Football
League v. National Football League, 27 F.R.D. 264, 268 (D. Md. 1961).
28. See Manton, 493 F. Supp. at 496-97; Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F.
Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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dependent upon generating national interest in the sport, and league
scheduling ensures that each team will make regular rounds on the na-
tional circuit.2 9 Thus, games played in the forum state are not isolated
insignificant events, but rather are purposeful and continuous activities
constituting the very essence of professional sports.3° However, despite
the conceptual validity of this view, whether playing games in the forum
state is itself sufficient to establish jurisdiction is unclear, as courts focus
on the full array of contacts teams customarily maintain with the forum
state.31
2. Team Revenues From The Forum State
A team may receive revenues generated in the forum state resulting
from playing games within that state.32 This frequently occurs where the
visiting and home teams share gate receipts. If the defendant's activities
within the state are economically substantial, a court will most likely
conclude that sufficient "minimum contacts" exist to assert personal ju-
risdiction in the forum state. Moreover, even where a league agreement
allocates gate receipts solely to the home team, jurisdiction may never-
theless be proper because the essential business nature of the team's con-
tacts remains unchanged.33 In other words, because sports teams are by
their very nature interdependent, the method of distributing revenue
from sporting events should not significantly alter the due process
analysis.
3. Team Broadcasts and Recruiting
Teams will often have contacts other than those resulting directly
from league games. These contacts may stem from the maintenance of
training camps, the playing of exhibition games,34 or the transmission of
television and radio broadcasts into the state.35 Consideration should
also be given to the frequency, continuity and extent of recruiting efforts
29. See Manton, 493 F. Supp. at 496-97; Hawkins v. National Basketball Ass'n, 288 F.
Supp. 614 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
30. Travelers Health Ass'n, 339 U.S. at 648.
31. Id.
32. See Eckles v. Sharman, 548 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1977); Hawkins, 288 F. Supp. at 617;
American Football League, 27 F.R.D. at 267.
33. Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
34. See Hawkins, 288 F. Supp. at 617.
35. See Munchak Corp., 368 F. Supp. at 1369. See also Eckles v. Sharman, 548 F.2d 905
(10th Cir. 1977) (because sports broadcasts are relatively more important when they are local
or regional - and negotiated by the team as opposed to the league - broadcasts help to
demonstrate continuing and purposeful interaction with the forum state).
1987]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
in the forum state,3 6 as teams customarily employ scouts in various states
for recruiting purposes. Although courts generally do not find jurisdic-
tion on the basis of these secondary factors alone,3 7 when combined with
other salient factors, they are clearly relevant to the due process analysis
and the ultimate exercise of jurisdiction.38
III. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF STANDARD PLAYER CONTRACTS
The various collective bargaining agreements and standard player
contracts mandate that arbitration shall be the forum for resolving con-
tract disputes.39 Despite the fact that non-judicial dispute resolution is
contractually required, courts will nevertheless intervene in two main
contexts: (1) when an athlete "jumps" from one league to another and
the first team tries to restrain him;' and (2) when an athlete believes that
a team has breached his contract, and he refuses to play for that team.'
A. Teams' Restraint of Inter-League "Jumping"
1. Provisions In Standard Player Contracts Which Establish The
Team's Exclusive Right To The Athlete's Services
Standard player contracts in the various sports establish the team's
exclusive right to the athlete's services. Although the precise language of
"exclusivity" clauses vary among leagues, such clauses usually contain
the same basic language. Teams customarily insert clauses establishing
their right to the athlete's exclusive services to bolster their action for
injunctive relief should the athlete attempt to "jump" leagues.
a. Express Covenants
In the typical standard player contract, there are three types of cov-
enants that support the team's exclusive right to an athlete's services.42
36. See Martin v. Detroit Lions, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d 472, 108 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1973);
Rodwell, 45 Mich. App. at 415, 206 N.W.2d at 775.
37. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. United States Football League, 637 F. Supp. 46 (D. Minn.
1986) (where a plaintiff's cause of action does not arise from television broadcasts within the
state, broadcasts alone do not constitute sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction).
38. See Munchak Corp., 368 F. Supp. at 1369.
39. See generally J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 4.01 (1979 &
Supp. 1984); R. BERRY AND G. WONG, I LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES
§§ 5.30-.32 (1986). But see Pittsburgh Assocs. v. Parker, No. 86-1084, slip op. at 6-8 (W.D.
Pa. Aug. 5, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). (The arbitrator is necessarily divested of
jurisdiction when a party alleges that the contract is void due to fraud in the inducement).
40. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
41. See, e.g., Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, 40 Cal. 3d 406, 709 P.2d 826, 220 Cal. Rptr. 807
(1985).
42. See, e.g., NFL Contract, 2, 5, 8 (1975). See also NFL Contract 2-3 (1982).
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The first clause consists of the athlete's promise to play for the con-
tracting team. In most instances, the athlete promises to play "only" for
the team with which he signs. The second clause limits the athlete's mo-
bility by restricting his right to engage in other athletic activities.
Although the primary intent of this provision is to minimize the athlete's
exposure to injury, it also rather expansively supports a team's conten-
tion that the athlete agreed to provide his services exclusively to the con-
tracting team. 3 The third commonly used "exclusivity" clause specifies
that the athlete's services are "unique" and that the team is entitled to
seek an injunction if the athlete accepts employment with another team.
Needless to say, this clause is most frequently relied upon as the team's
primary basis for obtaining injunctive relief."
Courts are willing to enforce express negative covenants only to the
extent they satisfy a judicially enunciated test of "reasonableness." 4 In
analyzing the "reasonableness" of the covenant, courts typically focus on
whether the restriction's duration is equitable under all of the circum-
stances. Although "reasonableness" issues relating to negative covenants
are not frequently litigated in the context of major team sports (primarily
because the restriction usually exists only for the contracted period), oc-
casional cases involving individual sports such as boxing and tennis have
examined these questions.46
b. Implied Covenants
In the rare instance where an express covenant establishing the
team's exclusive right to services does not appear in the athlete's con-
tract, the team may seek injunctive relief on the theory that an implied
covenant exists. Both the commentators and the courts have provided
support for the general proposition that a covenant of exclusive services
43. Such a clause will restrict a player from competing in an unrelated sport, irrespective
of whether such activity is professional or amateur. See J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, THE
LAW OF SPORTS § 4. 10 (Supp. 1984) (citing Toronto Blue Jays Baseball Club v. Boston Celtics
Corp., No. 81-5263 slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)).
44. See, e.g., Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979, 982 (M.D.N.C. 1969);
Connecticut Professional Sports Corp. v. Heyman, 276 F. Supp. 618, 619 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
See also New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196, 1198
n. I (1st Cir. 1979).
45. See Madison Square Boxing, Inc. v. Shavers, 434 F. Supp. 449, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
See also Stevens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 235, 263-65 (1921).
46. See Shavers, 434 F. Supp. at 452; Machen v. Johansson, 174 F. Supp. 522, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 19 F. Supp. 392, 393 (D.N.J.),
aff'd, 90 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1937); Arena Athletic Club v. McPartland, 41 A.D. 352, 58 N.Y.S.
477 (1899). See generally Note, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts by Injunction, 34
TUL. L. REV. 621 (1960).
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will be implied if the contract language and the intent of the parties sus-
tain such an inference.47 In determining the intent of the parties, courts
characteristically focus on whether the arrangement was intended to be
"exclusive." 48 In major team sports, such an inference is easily estab-
lished, at least with regard to playing other professional sports.
2. Teams' Remedies
When a contract is breached in the commercial context, money
damages will usually make the plaintiff "whole," thereby providing an
adequate remedy at law which theoretically puts the plaintiff in the same
position he otherwise would have been in had the defendant not breached
the contract. However, in sports litigation, the adequacy of money dam-
ages is questionable because of the "uniqueness" of a particular athlete's
services.49 Accordingly, if a team concludes that money damages will
not sufficiently redress the athlete's breach, it will usually seek some form
of equitable relief.
a. Equitable Remedies
Notwithstanding occasional pronouncements to the contrary, a
team cannot obtain specific performance of a personal service contract.5 0
There are two primary justifications for this rule: (1) courts are reluctant
to issue an injunction compelling employment because of the inherent
logistical problems in effectively supervising and enforcing such decrees;
and (2) courts have historically viewed this form of affirmative relief as
violating public policy and the thirteenth amendment, as it subjects indi-
viduals to a form of involuntary servitude. However, as noted previ-
ously, 5 1 a team can obtain specific performance of a negative covenant,
thereby prohibiting the athlete from playing for another team during the
pendency of the contract.
52
47. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 380 (1932); see also Shavers, 434 F. Supp. at 452
n. 1l.
48. See supra note 47.
49. Some courts have concluded that money damages are adequate compensation for the
loss of an athlete. See Heyman, 276 F. Supp. at 621; Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116
F. 782, 783 (E.D. Pa. 1902); Columbus Baseball Club v. Reiley, I I Ohio Dec. 272, 275 (1891);
Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977). See also Comment,
Enforceability of Professional Sports Contracts - What's the Harm in It?, 35 Sw. L.J. 803, 811-
13 (1981).
50. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 379 (1932).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
52. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 684 (Ch. 1852). See also Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352
F. Supp. 870, 875 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Long Island Am. Ass'n Football Club, Inc. v. Manrodt, 23
N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1940); American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc.
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Although money damages may be available, a negative injunction is
usually the team's preferred remedy. In order to qualify for this form of
equitable relief, the team must satisfy the following threshold require-
ments of equity jurisdiction: (1) the "unique services" requirement; (2)
the "irreparable harm" requirement; and (3) the "economic competition"
requirement.
(1) The "Unique Services" Requirement
Equitable relief is generally unavailable unless a plaintiff-team can
demonstrate that its remedies at law are inadequate.5 3 If an athlete's
knowledge, skill, and ability are "unique," money damages will be
deemed inadequate. This conclusion is predicated on the view that no
two athletes are identical in terms of what they provide to a team. Ac-
cordingly, because money damages may be unobtainable due to the diffi-
culty in precisely quantifying the value of the athlete's services,
uniqueness is an important characteristic in establishing a basis for equi-
table relief.5 4
While the issue of uniqueness received considerable attention under
early case law,"5 the proposition that all athletes possess unique knowl-
edge, skill, and ability appears to be universally accepted today.5 6 Courts
typically57 conclude that "[p]rofessional players in the major baseball,
football and basketball leagues have unusual talents and skills or they
would not be so employed. Such players ... are not easily replaced."5 8
Indeed, a review of the existing case law in this area reveals that not a
441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup.
Ct. 1890); Lajoie, 202 Pa. at 210, 51 A. at 973; Comment, supra note 49, at 805-07.
53. 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 216-22 (5th ed. 1941).
54. See Comment, supra note 49, at 806; Comment, Enforcement Problems of Personal
Service Contracts in Athletics, 6 TULSA L.J. 40 (1968).
55. See Allegheny Baseball Club v. Bennett, 14 F. 257 (W.D. Pa. 1882); Columbus Base-
ball Club v. Reiley, 11 Ohio Dec. 272 (1891). Modern courts continue to address the issue,
although they almost always conclude the athlete is unique. See Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v.
Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 140 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (outcome of players' contract cases "usually
turns on whether the player is possessed of certain unique knowledge, ability and skill"); Pe-
ters, 352 F. Supp. at 876 ("The primary requisite for enforcing ... the contract ... is that the
player be an athlete of exceptional talent."); Harris, 348 S.W.2d at 42 (player must be "a
person of exceptional and unique knowledge, skill and ability"). See generally Comment,
supra note 49, at 807-11.
56. Peters, 352 F. Supp. at 876; Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio Op.
2d 130, 141, 181 N.E.2d 506, 517 (1961). See generally L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND
THE LAW (1977 & Supp. 1981). See also Brennan, Injunction Against Professional Athletes
Breaching Their Contracts, 34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 61, 70 (1967).
57. See, e.g., Barnett, 19 Ohio Op. 2d at 141.
58. Id. Barnett was a better than average player - he ranked 19th (out of 100) in scoring,
but did not make the East-West All Star Game or the U.S. Basketball Writers' All-NBA Team
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single reported decision has permitted an athlete to "jump" leagues on
the basis that he lacked unique skill. One court has even gone so far as to
hold that two rookies who had not yet obtained any professional experi-
ence possessed sufficiently unique skills to justify an injunction in favor of
the former team. 9 Thus, satisfying the requirement of "uniqueness" is a
virtual fait accompli in cases involving professional athletes.'
(2) The "Irreparable Harm" Requirement
Before a court will grant equitable relief, the plaintiff-team must also
demonstrate the likelihood of "irreparable harm"'" absent the issuance of
an injunction. Irreparable harm is essentially a requirement that the
plaintiff not have an adequate remedy at law.6 2 If a plaintiff-team is "ir-
reparably harmed," the amount of damages will probably be too specula-
tive and uncertain for a court to award money damages.63 Thus, because
legal remedies are inadequate, courts consider the availability of injunc-
tive relief.'
As a general proposition, the "irreparable harm" requirement in the
sports context is mere surplusage because it is satisfied by virtue of the
athlete's possession of unique skills.65 However, in Boston Professional
Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Cheevers,66 the district court disregarded this short-
hand analysis and instead assessed the effect of the loss of the athlete's
services on the former team's general economic position.67 In Cheevers,
the district court failed to find irreparable harm, notwithstanding the fact
for 1961. Nevertheless, the court concluded that he possessed skills sufficiently "unique" to
justify the imposition of equitable relief. Id.
59. Winnipeg Rugby Football Club v. Freeman, 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1955). See
also Harris, 348 S.W.2d at 42.
60. Peters, 352 F. Supp. at 876; Safro v. Lakofsky, 184 Minn. 336, 238 N.W. 641 (1931).
See generally Comment, Professional Athletic Contracts and the Injunctive Dilemma, 8 J. MAR.
J. PRAC. & PROC. 437, 440-44 (1975).
61. See Bergey, 453 F. Supp. at 138; Professional Sports, Ltd. v. Virginia Squires Basket-
ball Club Partnership, 373 F. Supp. 946, 948 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Lajoie, 202 Pa. at 210; Com-
ment, supra note 49, at 811-13.
62. Lajoie, 202 Pa. at 210 (holding that irreparable harm exists where there is no accurate
measure for assessing money damages).
63. Id. at 213.
64. Id.
65. See Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. Minn. 1972); Washington
Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 419
F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Professional Sports Ltd., 373 F. Supp. at 948-49.
66. 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972), remanded on other grounds, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir.
1972).
67. Id. See also Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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that the athletes possessed "unique skills."6 8
In spite of the Cheevers court's departure from the prevailing trend,
the decision does not appear to represent a permanent change in the law.
Additionally, Cheevers appears to be of dubious precedential value be-
cause the appellate court strongly questioned the validity of the lower
court's irreparable harm analysis.69 This interpretation of the effect of
the decision appears sound, as subsequent cases have expressly "balked"
on the Cheevers analysis and have continued to endorse the traditional
irreparable harm/unique skills test.70 Thus, the "irreparable harm" re-
quirement is probably a mere formality in the sports context since ath-
letes' skills are universally deemed unique.
(3) The "Economic Competition" Requirement
Numerous courts require a showing that the athlete "jumped" to a
team in direct economic competition with the original team before an
injunction will be issued.71 This requirement stems from the theory that
an injunction should be granted only when damages are caused by breach
of the negative covenant, and not solely from breach of the affirmative
promise to play for the team.72 However, a majority of courts have re-
jected this theory and will issue a negative injunction for breach of the
affirmative covenant so long as there is no adequate remedy at law.73
It is important to note that courts frequently ignore the "economic
competition" requirement because the athlete has "jumped" to a rival
team in the same sport. Major sports leagues are considered as operating
in a national, as opposed to a regional market, so even if the rival league
68. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.
1972), remanded on other grounds, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972).
69. Cheevers, 472 F.2d at 128.
70. See Hampson, 355 F. Supp. at 736. See also Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 515
S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
71. Harrisburg Base-Ball Club v. Athletic Ass'n, 8 Pa. C. 337, 341-42 (1890). See Freder-
ick Bros. Artists Corp. v. Yates, 61 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (Sup. Ct. 1946), rev'd on other grounds,
271 A.D. 69, 62 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1946). See also New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 592
F.2d at 1200; Toronto Blue Jays Baseball Club v. Boston Celtics Corp., No. 81-5263 slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 380 comment g (1932); Comment, Injunctions in Professional Athletes' Contracts - An Over-
used Remedy, 43 CONN. B.J. 538, 552-54 (1969).
72. See Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919 Equity, 33 HARV. L. REV. 420, 438-40
(1919-20); Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts in the Entertainment In-
dustry, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 18, 20 (1954); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1450 (rev. ed. 1937);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 380(1)(a) (1932) (co-authored by Williston). See also Har-
risburg Base-Ball Club, 8 Pa. C. at 337; Comment, Professional Athletic Contracts and the
Injunctive Dilemma, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 437, 445-46 (1975).
73. Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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is on the other side of the country, the teams will necessarily be viewed as
competitive. 74 Accordingly, the absence of local rivalry is not considered
an appropriate basis for the denial of equitable relief.
75
Even where the athlete "jumps" to a team in a different sport, an
injunction may properly be issued. Thus, in Toronto Blue Jays Baseball
Club v. Boston Celtics Corp. ,76 the Toronto Blue Jays successfully ob-
tained an injunction preventing Danny Ainge from negotiating to play
for the Boston Celtics, notwithstanding the fact that the teams garnered
revenue from distinct markets. The court concluded that because vari-
ous sports teams compete for fans' entertainment dollars, teams may be
deemed in direct economic competition even though they perform in dif-
ferent cities and participate in different sports.
However, where an athlete "jumps" to a team in another country -
other than Canada - courts will probably deny injunctive relief on the
basis of lack of economic competition. If the athlete "jumps" to a Cana-
dian team, the question whether an injunction will issue is wholly contin-
gent upon the particular sport implicated in the suit. Thus, because the
market for hockey presumably includes both the United States and Can-
ada,7 7 direct competition would likely be held to exist and the athlete
could be enjoined. In determining whether Canada should be included in
the relevant market for sports other than hockey, courts will be forced to
proceed on a case-by-case basis.
b. Legal Remedies - Money Damages
Although in most instances teams are only interested in obtaining
athletes' professional services, there are circumstances where teams will
be forced to settle for money damages. A typical example involves cases
where athletes, having successfully been enjoined from "jumping" to an-
other team, decide to "sit out" for the period of the injunction or retire.
Similarly, money damages may be desired as the exclusive remedy where
a dispute has engendered sufficient negative publicity to result in the ath-
lete's loss of popularity. A court might also order an award of money
damages where it is the only form of relief which will protect the rights
of both the team and the athlete.7 .
74. American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F. Supp. 60, 65 (D. Md.
1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124, 129-30 (4th Cir. 1963).
75. Id.
76. Toronto Blue Jays Baseball Club v. Boston Celtics Corp., No. 81-5263 slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
77. San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969 (C.D.
Cal. 1974).
78. See supra note 49. See also Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. at 269.
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It should be emphasized that in actions for money damages, recov-
ery may be obtained only where the team can prove damages with rea-
sonable certainty.79 Although this proposition is easily understood in the
abstract, valuation questions in the sports context are fraught with diffi-
culty due to the "uniqueness" of athletes' services. Nevertheless, there
are three distinct but related theories plaintiff-teams may employ to ade-
quately quantify their losses.
The first theory would permit teams to seek damages for expenses
incurred in connection with securing a substitute athlete. Damages
would consist of the contractual salary differential between the existing
athlete and the substitute performer, and whatever incidental costs the
team incurred in locating and signing the substitute performer. In addi-
tion, the team would presumably be entitled to consequential damages
foreseeably related to the athlete's breach. s° The primary difficulty with
this damage formula relates to whether the substitute athlete will be
viewed as "comparable" to the original performer. Because athletes are
not fungible, a court might conclude that any salary differential resulted
from the hiring of a more gifted substitute, thereby resulting in no net
loss to the team. Alternatively, a court might conclude that the team
simply paid more than market value for the replacement athlete. Thus,
damages may be limited solely to the cost of locating and signing the
substitute performer.
A second methodology for measuring damages focuses on a team's
overall economic loss resulting from an athlete's departure. t This
formula is similar to the differential value theory, except damages would
be limited to reduced gate, concession, and broadcast revenues, rather
than the cost of obtaining a substitute performer. Although this damage
formula may have considerable appeal to a particular team, it obviously
presents causation difficulties relating to whether such losses were proxi-
mately caused by the athlete's "jump" to another league.
A third measure of damages focuses on the salary differential be-
tween the athlete's original contract and his present contract. While this
theory avoids the quantification problems discussed above,"2 there is little
case support for its applicability in the sports context.8 3 Moreover, this
79. See Comment, supra note 49, at 813-18.
80. Eckles, 548 F.2d at 910.
81. See Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 675, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (1969)
(trial court used this measure of calculating damages, although damages were eventually de-
nied because the team obtained an injunction).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
83. See Roth v. Speck, 126 A.2d 153 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956); Triangle Waist Co. v. Todd,
223 N.Y. 27, 119 N.E. 85 (1918). See also Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1008, 1015-16 (1958).
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methodology may be undesirable from the team's standpoint since its
losses will typically exceed the net differential between the original and
present contract. Nevertheless, this measure of damages should be con-
sidered because its application will deter athletes from "jumping" to
other teams solely for financial benefit.84
3. Athletes' Defenses
Any defect which could otherwise be raised as a defense to a breach
of contract action should be evaluated in the sports context. For exam-
ple, the athlete may assert that his standard player contract is invalid
owing to technical deficiencies in valid formation. If no valid offer and
acceptance have been tendered,85 or if the parties merely "agreed to
agree," 86 the contract will be held unenforceable. Similarly, if the offer
made to an athlete is devoid of certainty and definiteness of terms (e.g.,
salary or length of service), or the team failed to comply with the applica-
ble Statute of Frauds, the contract will be deemed voidable.8 7 The ath-
lete may also assert defenses of fraud, duress, undue influence, incapacity
or unconscionability, and any additional contract defenses established
under applicable state law.88
a. Equitable Defenses
Even when a former team can establish the necessary prerequisites
for equitable relief, courts nevertheless have wide discretion in deciding
whether to grant such relief 9 In determining whether an injunction
should issue, courts balance the competing needs of teams, players, and
84. Notwithstanding the above, it should be emphasized that even if the team is willing to
accept money damages, the remedy may still be unavailable due to the difficulty of proving
damages with sufficient certainty.
85. See Detroit Football Co. v. Robinson, 283 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1960); Los Angeles Rams
Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
86. See Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198, 201-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1890); Alle-
gheny Baseball Club v. Bennett, 14 F. 257 (W.D. Pa. 1882).
87. See Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36, 42-43 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
840 (1966).
88.-See Pittsburgh Assocs. v. Parker, No. 86-1084,-slip op. at 6-8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (the court implicitly ruled that all standard contract de-
fenses, including "fraudulent inducement" and "material failure of consideration," may
apply).
89. See, e.g., New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc.,
291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961) (unclean hands of plaintiff); Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F.
Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972) (promotion of new league and harm to player outweigh harm to
club); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (harm to plaintiff not irreparable; focus on needs of new league); Minne-
sota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969) (unclean hands of plaintiff);
Connecticut Professional Sports Corp. v. Heyman, 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (lack of
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society at large.9° In attempting to challenge the propriety of equitable
relief, athletes should invoke the following equitable defenses which his-
torically have thwarted the granting of injunctive relief: (1) unclean
hands (2) lack of mutuality (3) perpetuality or illegality; and (4)
unconscionability.
(1) Unclean Hands
A fundamental principle of equity is that "he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands."'" Because the primary focus of the doc-
trine is on the party requesting relief, the defense may be raised even
though the defendant is also guilty of inequitable conduct.92 In sports
litigation, the unclean hands defense is typically asserted in two situa-
tions: (1) where an athlete "jumps" to another team and subsequently
rejoins his original team; and (2) where the team has engaged in im-
proper conduct at the time of the original contract.
When an athlete defects to another team and subsequently attempts
repatriation, the second team will often institute an action to enforce its
negative covenant guaranteeing the athlete's exclusive services.93 The
athlete will typically defend on the ground that the second team is pre-
cluded from equitable relief because it impermissibly interfered with the
original employment agreement.94 Courts will generally uphold the un-
clean hands defense in this situation.95 However, where the new contract
requires the athlete's services to begin after his original contract expires,
the court will uphold the countervailing public policy supporting free
mutuality and harshness of contracts). See also 1 R. BERRY AND G. WONG, LAW AND BusI-
NESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES § 2.14 (1986).
90. See New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc., 291
F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Comment, Enforceability of Professional Sports Contracts -
What's the Harm in It?, 35 Sw. L.J. 803, 807 (1981).
91. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 814 (1945); 2 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §§ 397-404 (5th
ed. 1941).
92. See, e.g., New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc.,
291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961); Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F.
Supp. 1193, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969) (impropriety of defend-
ant's conduct does not aid the case of an otherwise culpable plaintiff).
93. See, e.g., Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
94. See Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 331 F. Supp. 872 (M.D.N.C. 1971), rev'd, 457
F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972); Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp.
1193 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969); Minnesota Muskies v. Hudson, 294
F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969); Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich. 1914), aff'd,
215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914).
95. Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 331 F. Supp. 872 (M.D.N.C. 1971), rev'd, 457 F.2d
721 (4th Cir. 1972).
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competition and disallow the defense.96 Additionally, one court disal-
lowed the defense where the new team paid the athlete to "sit out" his
option year, concluding that an athlete always has the right to sideline
himself and not play at all.
97
A team's "improper conduct" need not amount to criminality or
provide a basis for a legal claim to support a charge of unclean hands.98
Virtually any form of dishonesty or improperly motivated behavior will
provide a basis for precluding the granting of equitable relief.99 For ex-
ample, the defense may be asserted where a professional team signs an
athlete before his college season has ended - thereby resulting in the loss
of college eligibility - and the athlete finishes the college season and
plays in post-season tournaments."°° If both parties agree to keep the
contract secret, and the athlete later signs a more lucrative contract with
another team, the original team's request for injunctive relief may be
denied. 1O
A collateral issue which may arise in connection with the unclean
hands defense is whether an assignment of the contract to a new team
vitiates the athlete's defense. If the unclean hands defense is based on an
alleged contractual defect (such as requiring the services of the athlete
before the original contract expired), then it appears that the athlete's
defense will survive the assignment."°2 However, if the defense is predi-
cated on the theory that the contract was secured by improper means,
96. Id. (where the new agreement does not require that the player perform under the new
contract until after the expiration of the original contract, the new club has not acted with
"unclean hands"); Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp. 1193
(N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969); Minnesota Muskies v. Hudson, 294 F.
Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969) (even if the former team has not yet exercised its option, the new
club would be acting with "unclean hands" if it signed the athlete to play during the option-
year of the original contract); World Football League v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc.,
513 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
97. Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972).
98. See New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc., 291
F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961) (conduct need not be criminal nor need it give rise to a legal claim).
99. Id.
100. -See-NCAA Manual of the National -Collegiate Athletic Association, CONST. art.-3:1,
rules 12-13 (1986).
101. This was the precise fact situation in New York Football Giants, Inc., 291 F.2d at 472-
74, where the court concluded that deceitful conduct was sufficient to give rise to the defense.
However, on similar facts, the court in Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir.
1966), granted an injunction holding that neither the early signing nor the failure to publicize
the contract was illegal or inequitable. A court's expansive discretion in equitable matters is
perhaps the best explanation for this inconsistency, although the Giants case doctrinally offers
the better rule. See Comment, Contractual Rights and Duties of the Professional Athlete -
Playing the Game in a Bidding War, 77 DICK. L. REv. 352, 371-79 (1972-73).
102. See Hudson, 294 F. Supp. at 990.
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the answer is uncertain.' 3 Although the case law in this area is not uni-
form, the better view is that the assignee of a contract is not a wrongdoer,
and the athlete should not be permitted to successfully assert the defense
against the assignee. 0 4
(2) Lack Of Mutuality
Although mutuality has numerous meanings in various contexts, the
term most frequently refers to the required reciprocal exchange of con-
sideration between the promisor and the promisee to a bilateral contract.
In the sports context, mutuality has a specialized meaning which denotes
a required mutuality of remedy"0 5 or obligation.0 6 Notwithstanding the
fact that lack of mutuality was a primary defense in early sports cases,
10 7
today the doctrine is all but dead.' 8 The modern focus in sports cases is
not on mutuality per se, but rather on whether equity will enforce an
unfair bargain."0 9
(3) Perpetuality And Illegality
Professional sports contracts frequently bind the athlete to a term of
years, while the team is vested with the right to terminate on a few days
notice. "o Standard player contracts also typically provide the team with
a unilateral option to renew the contract. From the athlete's standpoint,
if no limit is set on the number of times the renewal option may be exer-
cised, the team effectively has a perpetual right to the athlete's serv-
ices."' Because of the oppressive nature of such clauses, option
103. Id.
104. See Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc., 304 F. Supp. at 1199.
105. Lack of mutuality of remedy is present when the club can obtain specific performance
of the player's negative covenant, but the player cannot obtain specific performance of the
club's obligations owing to its power to terminate the contract.
106. Lack of mutuality of obligation occurs when the player is bound for some definite
period of time (e.g., one year with an option on the part of the club to renew for another year)
while the club can terminate its obligation at any time or upon short notice (e.g., ten days).
107. See Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116 F. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1902); Cincinnati Exhi-
bition Co. v. Johnson, 190 Iil. App. 630 (1914); American Base Ball & Athletic Exhibition Co.
v. Harper, 54 CENT. L.J. 449 (Cir. Ct. St. Louis 1902); American League Baseball Club of
Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v.
Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Harrisburg Base-Ball Club v. Athletic Ass'n, 8 Pa. C. 337
(1890); Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Hallman, 8 Pa. C. 57 (1890).
108. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 372 (1932), which suggests that the requirement
of mutuality of remedy be abandoned: "The fact that the remedy of specific enforcement is not
available to one party is not a sufficient reason for refusing it to the other party." Id.
109. See Connecticut Professional Sports Corp. v. Heyman, 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Manrodt, 23 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
110. See, e.g., Chase, 86 Misc. at 466-67, 149 N.Y.S. at 20; Ward, 9 N.Y.S. at 783.
111. Compare Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 134, 181
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arrangements of this sort have been attacked on grounds of illegality." 2
Thus, a contract may be held illegal because it subjects the athlete to
perpetual, involuntary servitude, or otherwise operates as an unlawful
restraint of trade. 113 However, changes in standard player contracts re-
sulting from litigation and collective bargaining have reduced the useful-
ness of the illegality defense." 4 Thus, current standard player contracts
are much less susceptible to a claim of involuntary servitude or restraint
of trade. 11 5
(4) Unconscionability
As in any other contractual setting, an athlete may assert uncon-
scionability as an affirmative defense. 1 6 Modem courts scrutinize the
fundamental fairness of contracts, requiring that terms fairly proportion
the rights and duties of the contracting parties. In sports litigation, un-
conscionability has particular applicability in challenging reserve or op-
tion clauses, which are common in standard player contracts. If contract
terms are sufficiently harsh and oppressive, modem courts will simply
refuse to enforce those terms." 7 Although an attack on option or reserve
clauses predicated on illegality may fail, an appeal to the fairness of the
court may still succeed, as courts retain discretion to deny enforcement
of unconscionable agreements. " 8
When courts take action to enjoin a "jump," some authority exists
for the proposition that the defendant-athlete's rights will be protected by
examining whether the former team will satisfy all of its obligations
N.E.2d 506, 510 (1961) (interpreting such a contract to be renewable for one year only) with
Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D. Minn. 1972) (professional hockey con-
tract found to be for perpetual services).
112. See Harper, 54 CENT. L.J. at 454; Chase, 86 Misc. at 466-67, 149 N.Y.S. at 20. See
also Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1971), aff'd on other grounds, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). See generally Schneiderman, Professional
Sports: Involuntary Servitude and the Popular Will, 7 GONZ. L. REV. 63 (1971); Note, Reserve
Clauses in Athletic Contracts, 2 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 302 (1970); Comment, Injunctions in Profes-
sional Athletes' Contracts - An Overused Remedy, 43 CONN. B.J. 538, 550-52 (1969).
113. Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1-972) (Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § -2-(1973), applied to bar hockey-reserve
clause).
114. See Harris, 348 S.W.2d at 42 (option clause delimited by provision stating that "after
such renewal this contract shall not include a further option to the club to renew the
contract").
115. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d
Cir. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88. See also Connecticut Sports Corp. v. Hey-
man, 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).




under the contract - the most important of which are the former team's
ability and willingness to continue paying the athlete's salary. 1 9 Some
courts will ensure this protection by issuing a conditional injunction.'20
b. Other Defenses
(1) Lack Of Commissioner's Approval
Athletes have been successful in the past in avoiding their contracts
when the Commissioner's signature was a condition precedent to its en-
forceability, and the signature was not obtained.'21 However, current
standard player contracts provide that the contract is enforceable imme-
diately, although a condition subsequent is provided whereby the Com-
missioner can invalidate the contract within a specified period of time. 22
Thus, this defense is currently of little use.
(2) Team Concurrently Requests An Injunction And Arbitration
Teams may enforce the parties' agreement to arbitrate contractual
disputes, 123 and many courts will also grant a preliminary injunction to
maintain the status quo until arbitration is completed.' 24  However,
when both types of relief are requested, some courts will order arbitra-
tion but forego granting equitable relief, usually on the ground that the
issuance of a temporary injunction is prohibited by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act 25 which expressly limits judicial intervention until after arbitra-
tion is completed.' 26  Obviously, this interpretation of the Federal
Arbitration Act may potentially result in the athlete continuing to breach
the contract during the pendency of the arbitration proceeding.
27
119. See Manrodt, 23 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 373 (1932).
120. See supra note 119.
121. Detroit Football Co. v. Robinson, 186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, 283 F.2d
657 (5th Cir. 1960); Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal.
1960).
122. See. e.g., NFL Standard Player Contract § 19 (1982).
123. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Thompson, 553 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Nassau
Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
124. See supra note 123.
125. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
126. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985)
(memorandum decision denying certiorari on precisely this issue; White and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
127. Albatross S.S. Co. v. Manning Bros., 95 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). But see Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shubert, 577 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (court
indicated that while it would normally not grant both remedies, such relief might be available
if the employment contract specifically contemplated both remedies).
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B. Athletes' Remedies Against Breaching Teams
Athletes have occasionally attempted to resort to the courts when
alleged breaches involve improper removal of the athlete from the ros-
ter, 2 8 wrongful termination,' 29 enforcement of injury provisions, 30 and
fraud. 13' Teams usually respond by requesting that the court compel ar-
bitration and stay or dismiss the action. 32 Upon a request for judicial
intervention, the court must initially determine whether a valid arbitra-
tion clause exists and whether the dispute falls within the parameters of
that clause. Additionally, a recent district court decision held that since
the right to arbitration is dependent upon the existence of a valid con-
tract, courts possess jurisdictional authority to determine whether the
contract compelling arbitration is void ab initio. 13' Because federal law
generally preempts state law on questions of arbitration, federal courts
may assert jurisdiction to determine arbitrability even if a similar state
court action is pending. 134 Insofar as courts are obligated to follow fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration, the parties will be directed to settle
through the agreed upon manner unless the arbitration clause cannot be
construed in any manner to cover the dispute in question. 
3
1
A dispute will be viewed as excluded from a broad arbitration provi-
128. Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, 40 Cal. 3d 406, 709 P.2d 826, 220 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1985).
129. Kings Professional Basketball Club, Inc. v. Green, 597 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1984);
Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
130. Hennigan v. Chargers Football Co., 431 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1970); Chuy v. Philadel-
phia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Brinkman v. Buffalo Bills Foot-
ball Club - Division of Highwood Service, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 699 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Sample v.
Gotham Football Club, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Pittsburgh Assocs. v.
Parker, No. 86-1084, slip op. at 6-8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file).
131. Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
132. See, e.g., Kings Professional Basketball Club, Inc. v. Green, 597 F. Supp. 366 (W.D.
Mo. 1984). But see Hennigan v. Chargers Football Co., 431 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1970); Chuy v.
Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Sample v. Gotham Foot-
ball Club, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In all three cases, the courts looked at various
injury provisions in the NFL contract with no mention of arbitration. These exceptions to the
general rule mandating arbitration may have been overruled by the addition of an exclusive
injury grievance section to the NFL Standard Player Contract_(see NFL Standard Player Con-
tract § 13 (1982)). The Brinkman court seemed to acknowledge this in declining to examine
an "injury" complaint owing to plaintiff's failure to follow mandatory procedures. Brinkman,
433 F. Supp. at 702-04.
133. See Pittsburgh Assocs. v. Parker, No. 86-1084, slip op. at 6-9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
134. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Kings
Professional Basketball Club, Inc. v. Green, 597 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
135. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Corp., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960); Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, 40 Cal. 3d 406, 709 P.2d 826, 220 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1985).
See also supra note 133.
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sion only where: (1) an express clause excludes the matter, or (2) an am-
biguous provision exists along with "the most forceful evidence" showing
an intention to exclude the issue.' 3 6 Because federal law dictates all-en-
compassing coverage and typical arbitration clauses are expansive in
scope, courts frequently find that arbitration should be ordered and the
civil action merely stayed. 137 Nevertheless, a team may be estopped from
requiring arbitration if it waives the clause either expressly, or impliedly
through undue delay in making its request.
38
Once arbitration is ordered, the court will take a strict "hands off"
approach, requiring both procedural and substantive questions to be arbi-
trated. 3 9 Courts are even powerless to examine the "fairness" of the
agreed upon arbitration arrangement."'° The only exception to this lais-
sez-faire approach occurs when the court concludes that the athlete's
representatives have breached their duty of "fair representation" in the
arbitration process. ' However, in reviewing fair representation ques-
tions, courts give substantial deference to the union's actions, requiring
that the athlete prove that the union's conduct was "arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, or in bad faith."' 42 Mere negligence is not sufficient. 
t43
Review of an arbitrator's decision is also very limited, and all doubts
will be resolved in favor of upholding the award."' The critical question
on review is whether the arbitrator's decision "draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement,""''4 and the court will not review de
novo the general merits of the case.' 46 Moreover, although courts will
refuse to uphold arbitration awards which are illegal or against public
136. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d
615, 621 (8th Cir. 1976).
137. See, e.g., Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
But see Johnson v. Green Bay Packers, 272 Wis. 149, 74 N.W.2d 784 (1956) (former NFL
arbitration clause much more restricted in scope; controversy falling outside of the provision
was not arbitrable).
138. Spain v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 593 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
139. Kings Professional Basketball Club, Inc. v. Green, 597 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
140. Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, 40 Cal. 3d 406, 709 P.2d 826, 220 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1985).
141. Id. See also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1976).
142. Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 190 (1967)).
143. Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1253.
144. American and National Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League Base-
ball Players Ass'n, 59 Cal. App. 3d 493, 130 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1976).
145. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960); Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d
615 (8th Cir. 1976).
146. See supra note 145.
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policy, they are extremely reluctant to make such declarations.147
IV. TEAMS' RESTRAINT OF INTRA-LEAGUE "JUMPING"
The various league rules, constitutions and contracts operate, inter
alia, to regulate athletes' movement between teams in the same league
during the contract period.1 48 Any action by an athlete, team, or league
employee soliciting "intra-league jumping" is considered "tampering."
A "tampered" contract will not receive the required approval of the re-
spective league commissioners, and those involved may be suspended
and/or fined. 49 The tampering provisions may even prohibit discussions
that relate to employment after the contract expires, unless the team's
consent is first obtained.150
The tampering provisions are designed to preserve harmonious rela-
tions among league members,"5 t but are only effective when the players
are under contract to a team in the league.1 52 Once a team has breached
its contract with an athlete, the athlete can terminate his contract ac-
cording to the provisions thereof, and he may thereby become a free
agent. As soon as free agency is declared, the athlete may freely enter
into contracts with other league members. 53 Should the former team
object, the athlete will most likely be required to prove the breach
through arbitration. 154 Of course, any athlete who is already a free agent
due to the expiration of his contract will also be insulated from the tam-
pering provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to provide a conceptual framework for
analyzing legal issues which commonly arise in sports contract litigation.
An implicit component of this framework is that "sports law" is nothing
more than a specialized application of traditional legal principles. Ac-
cordingly, sports practitioners should evaluate the full array of legal is-
147. American and National Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 498-
99, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 628-29.
148. See, e.g., NBA CONST. $ 35(g) (1984); Major League Baseball Rule 3(g) (1986); NHL
Standard Player's Contract § 10 (1982).
149. See, e.g., NBA CONST. 35(g) (1984).
150. See, e.g., NHL Standard Player's Contract § 10 (1982).
151. Major League Baseball Rule 3(g) (1986).
152. American and National Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League Base-
ball Players Ass'n, 59 Cal. App. 3d 493, 130 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1976).
153. Id. See also S. Heiner, Post-Merger Blues: Intra-League Contract Jumping, 18 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 741 (1977) (providing a more detailed discussion of the strategies and defenses
involved in such actions).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 128-47.
[Vol. 7
1987] SPORTS CONTRACTS 25
sues which relate to the propriety of jurisdiction, the theoretical bases
supporting relief, the availability of legal and/or equitable relief, and the
applicable contract defenses.
Additionally, practitioners must consider the effect of the applicable
collective bargaining agreement, as it may significantly alter the common
law result. Similarly, the appropriateness of arbitration as the forum for
dispute resolution must be determined. Nonetheless, practitioners are
well-advised to adhere to the general proposition that fundamental com-
mon law concepts should not be overlooked in sports litigation.

